Ritland v. Rowe

Which Statute of Limitations Applies When Two Montana Deadlines Conflict? Ritland v. Rowe, 260 Mont. 453, 861 P.2d 175 (1993)

Boland Aarab PLLP

The longer one. In Ritland v. Rowe, 260 Mont. 453, 861 P.2d 175 (1993), a unanimous Montana Supreme Court held that when a negligence claim seeks damages for injury to property, the three-year negligence period and the two-year property-damage period conflict, and any substantial doubt must be resolved in favor of the longer period. The Court reversed a dismissal that Tom Boland‘s client, one of two defendants, had won in the District Court.

Key Takeaways

• “Where there is a substantial question regarding which of two statutes of limitations should apply,” a court must apply the one “containing the longer limitation” (Ritland, 861 P.2d at 178).
• A negligence claim for damage to property is governed by the three-year period in § 27-2-204(1), MCA, not the two-year period in § 27-2-207, MCA (861 P.2d at 178).
• The “specific statute controls the general” rule did not decide the case. Each statute was specific in its own way, one to the type of obligation and the other to the type of damage (861 P.2d at 178).
• The rule rests on the policy of giving “a plaintiff party-litigant maximum free access to our court system” (861 P.2d at 178, quoting Thiel v. Taurus Drilling).

In this case sheet: At a glance · What the Court held · Our position and how the Court differed · What changed · Statutes · When it applies · How hard · FAQ

The practice Tom Boland built is the practice that handles your case today. Contact Boland Aarab PLLP for a free consultation at (406) 315-3737.

At a glance

What did the Montana Supreme Court hold in Ritland v. Rowe?

Kenneth and Jennifer Ritland, Chouteau County ranchers, alleged that in June 1989 the defendants got permission to graze cattle on their land, mixed in with the Ritlands’ herd. They claimed the defendants knew, or should have known, that their cattle were infected with trichomoniasis, a venereal disease that causes cattle to abort. The Ritlands’ cattle became infected, damaging their herd and ranching operation (861 P.2d at 176).

For the motion, the parties agreed that the claim accrued no later than December 8, 1989. It was filed April 10, 1992, more than two years but less than three years later (861 P.2d at 176). The District Court held that the two-year property-damage statute, § 27-2-207, MCA, was the more specific statute and barred the claim (861 P.2d at 176).

The Supreme Court reversed. It reviewed the authorities the defendants cited and found that “for the most part, they are not on point.” That included Quitmeyer v. Theroux, where the specific issue had not been argued or squarely decided (861 P.2d at 177–78). It then applied the rule from Thiel v. Taurus Drilling that doubt should be resolved in favor of the longer period. The Court held that the three-year negligence period in § 27-2-204(1), MCA, governed (861 P.2d at 178).

What did Tom Boland argue, and how did the Court differ?

Our client’s position. Tom Boland represented Merle Heitzman, one of the two defendants. Both defendants moved for summary judgment on the statute of limitations (861 P.2d at 176). Their position was that § 27-2-204, MCA, is a general statute for all torts, while § 27-2-207, MCA, is a specific statute for torts that damage property. Under § 1-2-102, MCA, the particular statute controls when the two conflict (861 P.2d at 177). The District Court agreed.

The Court’s view. The Court held that this was “not a case where a general statute of limitations is in conflict with a more specific statute.” Section 27-2-204(1) is specific to the type of obligation (negligence), and § 27-2-207 is specific to the type of damage (property). When a negligence claim seeks property damages, the two conflict. In that situation the doubt goes to the longer period (861 P.2d at 178). No justice dissented.

What did Ritland change in Montana law?

Ritland took the rule from Thiel, a securities case, and applied it to ordinary tort claims. When two limitation periods fairly apply, the longer one controls. The Court explained that this “best furthers the public policy recognized in Thiel” of maximum access to the courts (861 P.2d at 178).

Later Montana Supreme Court decisions cite Ritland for this rule, including:

• Kearney v. KXLF Communications (1994);
• Semenza v. Bowman (1994);
• Estabrook v. Baden (1997), describing Ritland as holding that the three-year tort period controlled over the two-year property-damage period;
• Royal Insurance Co. v. Roadarmel, 2000 MT 259;
• Haux v. Montana Rail Link, 2004 MT 233, quoting the “longer period of limitations” language (260 Mont. at 457, 861 P.2d at 178);
• Missoula County v. State, 2024 MT 98.

The rule applies only when there is a “substantial question” about which statute governs. It is not a license to choose the longest period in every case.

Which Montana laws and rules apply?

• § 27-2-204, MCA: three years for tort actions “upon a liability not founded upon an instrument in writing,” and three years for wrongful death. When Ritland was decided, subsection (1) referred to exceptions in §§ 27-2-216 and 27-2-217. The current text refers to § 27-2-216, and a version effective October 1, 2026, adds § 27-2-219.
• § 27-2-207, MCA: two years for injury to real or personal property.
• § 1-2-102, MCA: when a general and a particular provision are inconsistent, the particular one controls. This was the defendants’ argument (861 P.2d at 177).
• Mont. R. Civ. P. 56 (summary judgment) (861 P.2d at 176)

When might Ritland apply to you?

• A negligent act damages your property. Livestock, a vehicle, a building or equipment is damaged by someone’s carelessness. Ritland supports the three-year negligence period rather than the two-year property period.
• Your claim fits more than one category. Contract, tort and statutory theories often overlap. If there is a real question about which deadline governs, Ritland says to resolve it in favor of the longer period.
• You are close to the two-year mark. Do not rely on Ritland to save a late filing. The safest course is to file within the shortest period that might apply.

Every case turns on its own facts and on the claims actually pleaded.

How hard is it to win a statute-of-limitations appeal in Montana?

The standard of review is favorable, because the question is one of law.

• Standard of review. The Supreme Court reviews summary judgment using “the same criteria used by a district court initially under Rule 56.” Summary judgment is proper only when there are no genuine issues of material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law (861 P.2d at 176).
• Pure legal question. In Ritland, the parties agreed on the accrual date, so the appeal turned only on which statute applied (861 P.2d at 176). That made the District Court’s ruling a question the Supreme Court could decide fresh.
• Policy tilts toward access. Where the statutes genuinely conflict, the tie goes to the plaintiff (861 P.2d at 178).

The Boland Aarab Way

Thomas E. Boland represented defendant Merle Heitzman in this appeal, and his client lost. Tom was admitted in 1974 and practiced in Great Falls from 1979. His daughter, Caitlin Boland Aarab, and Samir F. Aarab founded Boland Aarab PLLP in 2017 as the successor to his practice. We publish losses alongside wins because they show how Montana law develops. The rule Tom argued against in Ritland now protects injured people’s access to court, including in the catastrophic injury cases and serious trucking and injury cases the firm handles today. When you hire Boland Aarab, you work directly with the attorneys who carry that practice forward.

Frequently Asked Questions

What happens when two Montana statutes of limitations could apply? If there is a substantial question about which applies, the doubt is resolved in favor of the statute with the longer period (Ritland, 861 P.2d at 178).

How long do I have to sue for negligent damage to my property in Montana? Under Ritland, a claim based on negligence that seeks property damages is governed by the three-year period in § 27-2-204(1), MCA, not the two-year period in § 27-2-207, MCA (861 P.2d at 178).

Does the more specific statute always control? Not here. The Court held that both statutes were specific in different ways, so the specific-over-general rule in § 1-2-102, MCA, did not resolve the conflict (Ritland, 861 P.2d at 177–78).

Work With the Lawyers Behind These Cases

Boland Aarab is a Great Falls trial firm built on Tom Boland’s practice. The same attorneys who brief and argue before the Montana Supreme Court handle our clients’ serious injury, trucking and wrongful-death cases from the first call. Contact Boland Aarab PLLP for a free consultation at (406) 315-3737.

About Boland Aarab PLLP: Boland Aarab PLLP is a Great Falls, Montana trial firm. Its attorneys, Caitlin Boland Aarab and Samir F. Aarab, have appeared in more than 40 matters before the Montana Supreme Court and have argued twice before the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit. The firm carries on the Great Falls practice Thomas E. Boland began in 1974. Meet our attorneys.

Sources:

• Ritland v. Rowe, 260 Mont. 453, 861 P.2d 175 (1993) (CourtListener PDF)
• Ritland v. Rowe (Google Scholar text with P.2d page numbers)
• Ritland v. Rowe (vLex, including the full counsel block)
• § 27-2-204, MCA
• § 27-2-207, MCA
• § 1-2-102, MCA

Disclaimer: This article is for informational purposes only and does not constitute legal advice. Reading it does not create an attorney-client relationship.